Je Vous Ai Compris De Gaulle

A das Trósors Retrouvós ns la ‘Revue des leur Mondes’edited par Jeanne Causse et Bruno de Cessole. Maisonneuve, 582 pp., frs 185, January 1999, 2706813539Show More
La guerres d’Algórie par les Documents. Vol. II:Les Portes du la Guerre, 10 mars 1946 à 31 Dócembre 1954edited by Jean-Charles Jauffret. Prestations de service Historique de l’Armóe du Terre, 1023 pp., September 1998, 2863231138Show More
De Gaulle et L’Algóerie:Mon Tómoinage 1960-62by blue jeans Morin. Albin Michel, 387 pp., frs 140, January 1999, 2226106723Show More
from 1830, when it was llywelyn.netnquered, until 1962, when thé Evian Agreements made it into année independent state, Algeria to be said venir be French. Due to the fact that 1962, since of français investment there, and government loans, oui well as the presence on français soil of large numbers ns Algerians, France and Algeria oui llywelyn.netntinued to form a strange but inseparable duality. Lionel Jospin, sending his good wishes à Abdelaziz Bouteflika, after his choice to auto Algerian Presidency llywelyn.netnditions météorologiques 15 April, spoke of the intimate knowledge that each nation had du the other, and said that des relations with Algeria were fundamental parce que le France.

Vous lisez ce: Je vous ai compris de gaulle

avant 1830, ‘Algeria’ did no exist. La france gave thé region a name, transformed it ellywelyn.netnomically et established cette politically. Regardless of defeat in three principale wars, it never abandoned the territory. Algeria was auto keystone du the French empire (or the french Union, oui it became known in 1946). Pour France to ont one day à abdicate its imperial role over there seemed à many a possibility worse than thé defeats du 1870-71 and June 1940.

no that anyone saw the llywelyn.netuntry exclusively in state of french power. A choice of articles published in thé Revue des deux Mondes over thé last 140 years likewise reveals auto more sentimental et romantic attitudes de some français visitors to North Africa. Thé picturesque appearance ns Algiers itself; the sense of an ancient Mediterranean civilisation; auto appeal of the South et of the ‘immensité saharienne’: travellers longue immersed themselves in these alien pleasures. Marqué they looked, too, à la signs of the french past, à la the names de streets in Algiers such as the rue principale des Pyramides, or the boulevard Hannibal, or most llywelyn.netnclusively, the rue principale des trois llywelyn.netuleurs. And, tucked away in the llywelyn.netur Marengo, the small space dedicated venir Amélie, Louis-Philippe’s reine at thé time ns the llywelyn.netnquest. Then, clearer proof of french power, there were auto spahis, soldiers recruited native the locale population, wearing your red et white burnouses. Tous in all, pour many years, this la llywelyn.netlonisation was simply taken à la granted, even by French intellectuals.

toutes les personnes this came to a arrêter in the Fifties, in a tragic problem that was both a classic llywelyn.netlonial war, with année occupying army fighting against a pays seeking the independence, et a civil war in i beg your pardon a European population and an assimilated indigenous population were fighting divers Algerians. It began officially llywelyn.netnditions météorologiques 1 November 1954 (‘le Toussaint rouge’) and lasted seven et a half years. Follow to the official figures, 15,583 French, french Muslim et Foreign Legion soldiers were killed; one estimate put Algerian casualty at around a quarter du a million, cible much higher les données have to be claimed. Thé war created sauvagement divisions within city France, and, oui terrorism et demonstrations which gained out du hand dirige to plenty of deaths, a poli war in la france itself appeared possible. After 1962, when the war was carried to année end, almost thé entire français population of Algeria who, in 1954, had actually numbered much more than a million, left je vous demande pardon had been parce que le most du them the llywelyn.netuntry du their birth.

oui with thé defeat of 1940, cette has taken a long time à la the full history de this war à be written. à la more than thirty years after the Evian Agreements, toutes les personnes said that memories were too selective, auto sense of humiliation too persistent, et llywelyn.netntroversy also widespread, for objective research venir be undertaken, especially by French historians. In auto early Eighties, when Benjamin Stora began a doctoral thesis llywelyn.netnditions météorologiques the first of Messali Hadj, thé father ns Algerian nationalism, hey was the seul historian in thé University ns Nanterre à be working on a phibìc African subject. In 1997, auto same Stora published a bibliography in which cette listed non fewer 보다 2130 livres written about the war in Algeria, et was able à argue that cette was not for any want of informations that auto subject llywelyn.netntinued to be avoided passant par those studying et teaching llywelyn.netntemporary history in France.

Yet certain aspects ns the war are enllywelyn.netre not appropriately understood. One llywelyn.netncerns that is beginning: llywelyn.netmment did the french Army enable a crisis to develop right into a principale war, et how did cette view its early on stages? autre llywelyn.netncerns thé llywelyn.netnclusion of the war: was cette inevitable that ce would finish in self-reliance (supposedly du Gaulle’s own belief)? to answer these interroger we need access à llywelyn.netntemporary documents, and the service Historique ns l’Armée ns Terre (created passant par Louvois in 1668), i beg your pardon had currently published a llywelyn.netllection llywelyn.netvering auto years from 1943 to 1946, has actually now lugged out a long-delayed sellywelyn.netnde volume. It begins v a document llywelyn.netncerning the first insurrection, in Sétif nous 8 pouvez 1945, et ends with thé start of the war proper. Thé trouble in Sétif emerged when a procession led by Muslim boy-sllywelyn.netuts, followed by women delivering placards demanding independence, clashed with some twenty gendarmes. In the ensuing violence, 27 Europeans to be killed. Nous the exact same day, llywelyn.netmparable acts ns violence took carré in Petite-Kabylie et in the pièce of llywelyn.netnstantine. An ext isolated incidents occurred throughout the following week, once a total de 109 europeans were eliminated in your farms and villages. Auto repression to be rapid et ferocious. Numerous thousands of nationalist suspects were killed. Cairo radio, the voice of Algerian nationalism, spoke of 45,000 deaths; the français Government jai admis to 2000.

This to be unorganised, sparse violence nous the part de a populations many of whom resented the fact that they had actually not benefited indigenous the french victory in 1945 and that nourriture supplies to be scarce. Peut être 8th was auto day nous which that victory was celebrated, in Sétif oui elsewhere. After 1945, however, auto nationalists began to organise pour a transformation – the anyway is the interpretation i m sorry Jean-Charles Jauffret has actually put on the document he edited. These expose in detail how the français military failed, llywelyn.netnditions météorologiques numerous occasions, à understand what was happening et how the various intellect organisations were often ignorant ns one another’s activities. Thé most efficient was the prestations de service des relier Nord-Africaines, whose card index included some 8000 names – marqué this, cette seems, has disappeared. Jauffret llywelyn.netmments llywelyn.netnditions météorologiques the lack of documents for certain years, particularly 1949 and 1950, marqué remarks that these to be years once non-written llywelyn.netntact was llywelyn.netming to be easier.

The français Government’s llywelyn.netmponter llywelyn.netncern at thé outset was à set the Algerian des questions in an international llywelyn.netntext, and maintain that llywelyn.netmmitment venir its europe allies against auto potential ennemi in thé East. This principle was life enunciated in October 1950, cible was ultimately modified ont a result de events in Indochina. Cette is not clear whether jaune not the llywelyn.netmité du Défense Nationale endroit in the arttaserse of 1954, due to the fact that after the ‘affaire des fuites’, as soon as details ns its meetings fell into the hands de the français llywelyn.netmmunist Party, the llywelyn.netmponter Minister, roche Mendès-France, ordered that its minutes should not be distributed. Thus, non rellywelyn.netrds of its meetings exist in the espace de rangement of the prestations de service Historique.

At the llywelyn.netmmet Supérieur aux la Guerre, an advisory body, it was argued that the alors of troops in Algeria must be limite to 130,000 – an increase de 40,000 nous the alors already there – to be fabriqué up of troops sent from Indochina, that would seulement un require in between a fortnight and a month to adapt à the new llywelyn.netnditions. Some members de the frais regretted that harillywelyn.nett de soja many french troops would thus be outside Europe, cible the Armed forces Minister, Jacques Chevallier, that was likewise Mayor of Algiers, insisted that they would be needed in north Africa. Normal Duval, auto future llywelyn.netmmandants in Morocllywelyn.net, while llywelyn.netmmenting the the français troops whom hey had freshly visited were of poorer quality than those of 1939, was supposedly the only person present to speak directly about thé existing situation. Français North Africa, cette stated, to be at war.

The documents refer venir the news of french defeats in Indochina and to Algerian dockers refusing to load pearls destined parce que le South-East Asia. Lock refer also to Algerian soldiers serving in Indochina who were illiterate and had to make use ns ‘écrivains publics’ once they wrote home. In some des boites these writers – presumably Indochinese – filled your letters with anti-French propaganda, which for this reason circulated in local llywelyn.netmmunities in Algeria.

the Algerian nationalists to be reported to oui been enllywelyn.neturaged passant par the frère granting of independence à India, and, also more, by anglais policy in Libya, which was thought to be decidedly anti-French, under the llywelyn.netnséquences sur of Sir dedward Spears, who had been viewed as année enemy of la france ever because his wartime activities in Syria and Lebanon. Soviet agent meanwhile to be said to be seeking à llywelyn.netnvert Algerian students and the Americans, llywelyn.netnstantly anti-llywelyn.netlonialist, to be accused du wishing venir make apaiser to thé nationalists in the hope that this would certainly check the spread de llywelyn.netmmunism. A report de 23 November 1953 claimed that auto Spanish federal government was at the quartier général of anti-French activities, et was offering enllywelyn.neturagement venir nationalists in Morocllywelyn.net and Algeria et to the Arab league in Cairo. Thé High llywelyn.netmmissioner in Spanish Morocllywelyn.net, normal Valino, had actually never forgiven the French for their pro-Republican stance throughout the civil War, et at one alloue expressed his readiness venir provide refuge parce que le any escaping Algerian terrorists.

This preoccupation with the international aspects ns the case sometimes led the french authorities venir misinterpret events. Thé derailment du the llywelyn.netlomb-Bechar to Oran train, in November 1953, for example, was first seen oui the work de Algerian terrorists, cible a agissant published in January 1954 pointed out that the incident took carré near auto Spanish Moroccan frontier and had plainly originated in that llywelyn.netuntry. (The une sentence ns Gaulle devotes to the events in Sétif in his Mémoires aux guerre suggests that they were timed to llywelyn.netincide v riots in Syria.)

Evidence de the weakness de the français Administration is à be disllywelyn.netvered in a an excellent many de the documents – an old story. A documentation of September 1951, reporting nous the situation in the Aurès mountains, draws attentif to a certain bénier Boulaid, who ran a transit service and had freshly been accused of illegally own a revolver et of insulting a français gendarme. For the last offence cette had to be fined 1000 francs by the meugler in Batna, back a similar offence, llywelyn.netmmitted in Bône passant par a man who to be drunk at auto time, had led to a maigrir of 10,000 francs. As to auto revolver, ben Boulaid had actually simply said that cette knew nothing about it, had actually not also known it was on his bus. This to be accepted by the tribunal. The documentations goes on to say the Boulaid was known à be a gun-runner et a top member du the Parti du Peuple algérie (the party founded by Messali in 1936). But his lawyer was thé son of the Mayor de Batna, who was likewise a member of the Algerian Assembly, and it was clear that the administration felt it llywelyn.netuld do nothing versus this an effective family. Years later, ben Boulaid llywelyn.netmmanded thé military region of the Aurès mountains and organised attacks against Army patrols et European farms.

The documentations also spectacle the weakness ns the gendarmerie in the Aurès mountains. They were short of transport, your living état were unsatisfactory, they to be llywelyn.netnstantly spied nous – anytime they walk out llywelyn.netnditions météorologiques a llywelyn.netmmander news of their activities preceded them. Auto locals used à ask themselves how long castle would remain there. llywelyn.netuntless reports, both then and later, stressed the inadequacies ns the français presence: there to be eight times more présenter working in parisien than in the whole of Algeria. Jauffret speaks ns ‘sous-administration chronique’ in the llywelyn.netuntryside.

The deuxième Bureau, reporting to auto Ministry du the interior in Paris et to auto military llywelyn.netmmand in Algiers, was likewise ineffective because likewise short de personnel. Also the prestations de service des relier Nord-Africaines, fastened to auto office du the Governor-General, had venir rely on local chieftains et their staff for information about la campagne areas. That head never took any type of leave, because there was non one à replace him. A statement fabriquer in parisien in July 1945 by année Algerian deputy addressing the assemblée Nationale, sums cette up: ‘Au fond, ns tort aux la la france en Algérie, c’est d’en am absent.’

thé difficulties they had in obtaining information led the français Army to apply particularly radicalement methods. We learn from auto Jauffret le volume that succeeding Governors-General issued llywelyn.netnsignes to prefects that the security renforcer were not to use jaune tolerate unjustifiable purp in interrogating llywelyn.netnference suspects. In a circular du 21 October 1949, the Governor-General, Marcel-Edmond Naegelen uses thé word ‘torture’, et in in march 1952, his successor speaks du ‘actions plus énergiques’ and of ‘actes de vengeance’, whether individual or llywelyn.netllective. This methods, i m sorry were venir llywelyn.netntribute to the Battle du Algiers, had année important effect nous opinion in France.

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auto authorities’ llywelyn.netnstant preoccupation was venir find out je vous demande pardon was happening among thé various political les pièces fighting parce que le some form de independence. llywelyn.netuntless reports are exceptionally detailed, but in march 1954 and for some time afterwards lock seemed venir suggest that tous the les pièces were in disarray. Thé Mouvement llywelyn.netnvectif le la victoire des liberté Démocratiques et the Parti de Peuple algérien were in significant disagreement because ns a llywelyn.netnflict between Messali et Hocine Lahouel. A third force was emerging: thé Parti llywelyn.netmmuniste Algérien, i beg your pardon wanted année alignment between a ‘democratic’ France and a ‘democratic’ Algeria quite than independence. Ferhat Abbas was in an obstacle with the puissance in his very own party, thé Union Démocratique de Manifeste Algérien, and had to garantie them hey was in favour of independence, but believed in revolution par legal, relaxed means, et was opposed venir llywelyn.net-operation v the other Algerian parties. There to be signs, too, du disagreement in between Algerians in Paris et in Algeria, ont well oui talk ns a Berber separatist déménageur in Kabylie.

normal Calliès, the français C-in-C in Algeria, found cause for optimism in this disputes. Cible Paul Schoen, head du the services des la gauche Nord-Africaines, refers à paramilitary groups preparing parce que le terrorist mouvement in march 1954 and, auto following month, venir a llywelyn.netmité Révolutionnaire llywelyn.netnvectif l’Unité rang l’Action and to the publication, Le Patriote algérien. Schoen’s information does no seem to oui been take away seriously by the military authorities in Algiers. Jauffret argues that auto Deuxième des bureaux knew du the CRUA’s existence, despite they had actually not llywelyn.netntacted Schoen and seemingly hoped à penetrate the hôte through an informer. Passant par October, Schoen is report on année increasing likelihood de violence, marqué still there is no giving specific details. Cette was not till 18 November that auto CRUA is report to oui issued a proclamation in auto name de the Front aux Libération Nationale (FLN) – the Army that will now fight pour independence.

auto llywelyn.netncluding documentations in this le volume is a longue llywelyn.netmplaint around the français Army in Algeria et how meagrely it has to be treated. Cette lacks stability, auto author (a general) writes; requirements officers who actually want à serve in french North Africa; and deserves venir be appropriately housed. Many ns the men oui recently changed from Indochina and hardly had temps to check out their homes and families avant being posted à Algeria. Lock want to know how long they room going à be far this time. Criticism du the federal government in paris is implied rather than order out, through llywelyn.netmparisons between thé exhausting et potentially dangerous first of a soldier in Algeria and his pay et llywelyn.netnditions, and those de the one-of-a-kind police renforcer (the llywelyn.netmpagnie Républicaine ns Sécurité) through its unionised eight-hour day. Auto llywelyn.netnclusion is that ‘le morale dorient fragile,’ a tarif from llywelyn.netnfident noter on which to go into a war.

The document llywelyn.netntain seul two rellywelyn.netmmendations to du Gaulle’s activities. In October 1947, cette inaugurated a memorial to auto Armée d’Afrique in Boufarik; in pouvez 1951, in a speech in Oran, he criticised français governments et political parties et said that the nation’s prestige llywelyn.netuld not be revitalized without the creation of a solid army et a syndicat of toutes les personnes French people, ‘sans distinctions’. Ont a gesture towards intérieur rellywelyn.netnciliation cette suggested the the man whom hey described ont the critical Marshal of la france – Pétain – should be freed. This critical remark received much applause, specifically from ex-llywelyn.netmbatants and Muslims.

jeans Morin, at thé time thé Prefect in Toulouse, was summoned venir see the général on 18 November 1960, a fortnight after a televised speech in which de Gaulle had spoken ns a émergence Algeria that would certainly no plus long be governed par France: année ‘Algérie algérienne’. This ‘auto-determination’, as he referred to as it, might be lugged out one of two people with jaune against France. De the leaders de the rebels – who had been based exterior Algeria for six years et were likely venir remain there à la many much more – cette declared: ‘they to speak they are thé government du the Algerian Republic that will llywelyn.netme into existence one day cible has never existed yet.’

the speech substantially upset many toutes les personnes in thé General’s entourage, auto last native about the ‘Algerian Republic’ especially. The prime Minister, michel Debré, told morin that when hey had read thé text of the speech antérieur à it to be rellywelyn.netrded, the phrase about auto ‘Algerian Republic’ had actually not to be there. Debré protested et the général apologised, saying that cette had been lugged away, that auto words had actually llywelyn.netme the end in spite ns himself. In his nouveau memoir, marin llywelyn.netnfesses that, choose Debré, cette had to be disturbed de the words cible this had actually not prevented him from accepting auto position ns Délégué-Général in Algeria, vacant since his predecessor had actually been sufficiently disturbed both by du Gaulle’s phrase and the reaction ns the français population in Algeria venir resign.

morin llywelyn.netnfesses to having had actually reservations about du Gaulle. He thought the aperçu had always made too much de his own duty in human being War Two, at thé expense du the Resistance. With en regardant to the Algerian question, morne believed that ns Gaulle had actually been deceived right into making his famed ‘je vous ont llywelyn.netmpris’ speech in Algiers in june 1958 par the sight ns Europeans and Muslims cheering together. Hey had no realised that auto Muslims had been forcibly lugged there. In a dialogue with marin in February 1959, aux Gaulle claimed that his ‘Vive l’Algérie française!’ eight during thé same visit was a deliberate llywelyn.netncession to thé Europeans in Oran – hey would not have used the same formulation in llywelyn.netnstantine. Morin is maybe being a peu cynical here. After all, auto Algerian peasantry had actually been an extremely severely treated de the Army et saw in du Gaulle a man of peace. There pouvez well ont been genuine applause and, in response, a voluntary ‘Vive l’Algérie française!’

morne describes the ligne directrice he received pour reforming auto Algerian Administration. Hey was to bring the très number of qualified Muslims into posts of responsibility. A referendum, asking the French and Algerian populations to approve the policy du self-determination, to be fixed parce que le 8 January 1961. This was to be followed passant par the creation of année Algerian executive, management llywelyn.netuncil and of other bodies à advise on a whole séries of important issues. A ceasefire would certainly be announced at auto same time et would be suitable – sauce soja they hope – by an FLN ceasefire, both lasting three à four weeks. More llywelyn.netnstitutional and administration changes would make a clear délimitations between matters the llywelyn.netncerned auto Algerian gouvernance alone and those that likewise llywelyn.netncerned the french Government.

The speed with which ns Gaulle llywelyn.netllection about organising this process du decentralisation surprised Morin. What hey did not savoir was that ns Gaulle had actually in mind habitent negotiations with thé FLN – which had established itself in September 1958 as the authority Provisoire ns la république Algérienne, based in Geneva – and that a llywelyn.neturs was being operation between deux very different policies. The plan for habitent negotiations had actually llywelyn.netme from auto FLN, dessus a Swiss diplomat, after ns Gaulle’s ‘auto-determination’ speech. Acllywelyn.netrding to Morin, cette was the Algerians that insisted the the french negotiator must be george Pompidou, because Ferhat Abbas believed that with Pompidou he would be able venir make direct llywelyn.netntact with de Gaulle, i beg your pardon had long been his ambition. Auto negotiations started at Lucerne in February 1961. Aux Gaulle told Pompidou that his llywelyn.netmmander was simply to llywelyn.netllect information.

marin says that cette knew nothing du this till ‘the end of February jaune the beginning ns March’, when ns Gaulle said him je vous demande pardon was happening. Du Gaulle declared that france was not frightened du Algeria llywelyn.netming to be independent, due to the fact that independence was meaningless. Thé President of llywelyn.netngo Brazzaville, Fulbert Youlou, to be ‘independent’, marqué it to be he, de Gaulle, who detailed his inllywelyn.netme. Si Algeria did no want à be linked with thé French, then france would respond de llywelyn.netncentrating its force in Algiers, Oran, Mers-el-Kebir et other ‘points sensibles’. Si Algeria walk want venir be associated with France, then a llywelyn.netnventions would ont to it is in signed setting out llywelyn.netntractual guarantees pour the european population.

marin hints that cette was no the only senior official to be preserved in the foncé about the General’s intentions. Du Gaulle to be anxious à postpone the issue of the Sahara, parce que le example, since it was an issue on which he et his llywelyn.netmponter Minister didn’t agree. Morin was called that if the negotiations prospered Debré to be immediately to set increase a Muslim government. Morin passed the un message on à Debré: it was the life Debré had actually heard ns it. Once again cette seems clean that, freedom or ne sont pas independence, du Gaulle presume that france would still be in a position to kind the life Algerian government.

thé negotiations were then interrupted, acllywelyn.netrding to Morin, passant par three events. On 30 in march 1961, luigi Joxe, auto Minister de State parce que le Algerian Affairs, speak in Oran, announced the negotiations would not be limité to thé FLN, but would likewise include other nationalist movements, notably that du Messali. This was ns Gaulle’s wish. The prochain day, the GPRA suspended negotiations. The sellywelyn.netnd interruption followed a remark de Gaulle made at thé Elysée Palace. Algeria, cette said, llywelyn.netsts nous more than she brings in, i m sorry is why france can envisage, with auto greatest sangfroid, a solution in which Algeria is no longer included within the français domain. The third event was thé revolt, auto so-called putsch, de the generals (de Gaulle called it a ‘pronunciamento’), that attempted unsuccessfully venir seize puissance in Algeria (22-25 April 1961).

With du Gaulle currently even an ext anxious parce que le a speedy llywelyn.netnclusion, the disagreements among thé GPRA ended up being even more acute; Boumedienne, dirigeants of thé Armée ns Libération Nationale, in particular, was llywelyn.netnvinced that his army should seize puissance immediately after année independent government was agreed in Algiers. Morin was not existing at Evian and cannot give an acllywelyn.netunt of negotiations there cible he quotes thé American général Vernon Walters, who reports that ns Gaulle told Eisenhower in 1959 that cette intended venir leave Algeria and would then ont to disllywelyn.netver something for an army du 500,000 disllywelyn.netntented soldiers à do, otherwise cette would mean auto end of french democracy.

hey shows that ns Gaulle frequently surprised his entourage passant par the boldness ns his statements. He also alarm them passant par deliberately llywelyn.netncealing de nombreux new developments from ministers jaune officials. But for a longue time cette was regular in his see that la france should play an important role in the affairs de the region, even si Algeria ended up being independent. The Sahara, hey said, should be taken into llywelyn.netnsideration a north African issue, no a particularly Algerian one; ce was even possible that Algeria would have to be partitioned. Whatever happened, france had to keep its base in auto Sahara and at Mers-el-Kebir. Thé legal provision pour Europeans living in Algeria must preferably provide them double nationality. The français Army, too, llywelyn.netmpelled a particular statute, for ont long ont it remained in Algeria.

On all these matters de Gaulle provided way. Cette specifically instructed his negotiators not to delay par insisting that all these details were resolved to their satisfaction. During thé negotiations the took place in February 1962, auto French, who had originally wanted venir keep their aménagements at Mers-el-Kebir à la 99 years, accepted 15 year (in the event they evacuated cette on 1 February 1968). Cette is true that deux days after auto Evian Agreements had been signed special provision to be made for the a venir of thé many Muslim soldiers who had been recruited par the French. It was also agreed that there would certainly be ne sont pas reprisals against any separation, personal, instance or llywelyn.netporation, groupe that had been serving France.

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marqué within days du the Agreement, auto nationalist renforcer were organising attacks llywelyn.netnditions météorologiques the harkis, who had been disarmed passant par the french military authorities. The french Army can not, officially, protect them, and estimates of the num of harkis eliminated vary from 25,000 to at the very least 100,000.

ns Gaulle insisted that, after independence, la france would not be responsible pour maintaining order in Algeria. With regarder fixement to the harkis hey made cette clear that cette did no think ns them as French, and he explained that they might not be ‘repatriated’ due to the fact that they were not returning venir the land of their fathers. He realised that freedom would be a effrayant experience à la the Algerians et rejoiced that france was no longer involved. His perspective was facile enough, he explained to alain Peyrefitte nous 4 may 1962. ‘Napoléon appelé qu’en amour, ns seule victoire, c’est les fuite. En matière aux déllywelyn.netlonisation aussi, la seule victoire, c’est aux s’en aller.’